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1. INTRODUCTION
The rights of authors in relation to their works are today guaranteed 
worldwide within the copyright law. In the European Union (EU) all of econo-
mic progress is based on inventions and inventive work as an added value to 
every part of industry. Likewise, therefore, creative industries in the EU today 
seem to be a very important cog in the complex mechanism of incentives for 
economic growth and development, as they are in other most developed parts 
of the world. Therefore, authors deserve remunerations for the use of their 
works protected by copyright because nobody can expect that everyone shall 
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rights related to copyright, such as rights of performers, phonogram producers, 
film producers and others.
This text will analyse how the remuneration for authors and owners of 
related rights in music, film and similar entertainment industries should be 
determined. Since they can exercise their rights individually and collectively, 
the systems and criteria for setting the amounts of remuneration in individual 
and collective management will be examined. This analysis will be put in a 
traditional and in the online context. 
Collective management of copyright and related rights has for some time 
been in the focus of the interest of the European Commission1 as well as other 
influential persons who benefit from the development of creative industries, 
such as music producers, but also others whose undertakings depend on the use 
of copyrighted works, such as ISPs and telecoms. To regulate this on the EU 
level, Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26	February	2014	on	collective	management	of	copyright	and	related	rights	
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the 
internal market2 was issued and national legislators are obliged to implement 
its	provisions	in	national	copyright	legislation	by	April	2016.	This	Directive	is	
intended to improve the transparency of collective management for all collec-
tive management organizations (CMOs) but it also introduced a completely 
new legal framework for collective management in the online world. 
2.	COLLECTIVE	MANAGEMENT	–	TRADITIONAL	FEATURES	AND	
NEW RULES
Traditionally, CMOs are construed as territorial monopolies. They gene-
rally operate on the basis of the rebuttable legal presumption of representation 
of the global repertoire (the opt-out possibility is available), which is regulated 
either	expressly	by	the	law	or	developed	in	jurisprudence.	A	similar	effect	can	
1 See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment	and	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	–	The	Management	of	
Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market, COM(2004) 261 final, Brus-
sels,	16	April	2004;	Commission	Staff	Working	Document	–	Study	on	a	Commu-
nity Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright of 7 July 
2005;	Commission	Recommendation	of	18	May	2005	on	collective	cross-border	
management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services 
(2005/737/EC), OJEU L 276 of 21 October 2005 (hereinafter Commission Recom-
mendation of 2005).  
2 OJEU L 84 of 20 March 2014 (hereinafter Directive 2014/26/EU).
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be achieved through the system of extended collective licensing. Those two 
principles	–	the	principle	of	monopoly	and	the	principle	of	representation	of	
the	global	repertoire	–	rely	on	the	network	of	reciprocal	representation	agree-
ments among territorially organised CMOs.3	Because	of	the	CMOs’	monopoly	
position, most national legislatures in the EU developed systems of control of 
CMOs whereby they are in general not allowed to operate unless the national 
official	authority	approves	their	existence	and	controls	their	activity.	As	a	con-
sequence thereof, the system of tariff-setting is also more or less intensively 
susceptible to the control of the national official authorities or the councils, 
boards or similar bodies which act on the basis of independent experts but are 
directly or indirectly appointed by the state, in most cases by the competent 
minister or even the government. Those systems and procedures should ensure 
that	the	monopoly	position	of	the	CMOs	is	not	abused.	Although	the	mono-
poly position of CMOs was not regulated by any of the European Directives 
or Regulations, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confir-
med that it is not in contradiction with the EU law and general principles of 
the common market, as long as this monopoly position is not abused.4 
It seems that Directive 2014/26/EU does not interfere within the traditi-
onal features of CMOs when it regulates off-line uses.5 On the other hand, 
3 See	also	Gyertyánfy,	P.,	Collective Management of Music Rights in Europe after the CISAC 
Decision, IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
vol. 41, no. 1, 2010,	pp.	59	–	89,	who	summarises	eight	essential	traits	of	the	Euro-
pean	continental	CMOs,	pp.	66	–	67.
4 See OSA (C- 351/12, [2014]	ECR	00000),	at	10	(with	reference	to	Art.	98(6)(c)	of	
the	Copyright	and	Related	Rights	Act	 from	2000,	as	amended;	used	here	 is	 the	
unofficial	consolidated	text	from	March	2014	(hereinafter		Czech	CRRA),	which	
regulates that the relevant ministry may grant an authorisation for performing the 
management of copyright). It further pointed out that the legal monopoly is con-
sistent	with	Art.	16	of	the	Services	Directive	2006/123/EC	and	Art.	56	and	102	of	
the	TFEU.
5 Directive 2014/26/EU does not preclude the CMOs from concluding reciprocal 
representation agreements (both for online and offline uses) if these are not of 
an exclusive nature (Recitals 11 and 12 of Directive 2014/26/EU). This is not a 
novelty	 since	 the	 exclusivity	 clauses	were	 already	 abandoned	 among	 the	CISAC	
(international	 umbrella	 organisation	 of	 authors’	CMOs)	members.	Nevertheless,	
the abandonment of exclusivity as such did not change the de facto situation that 
exclusivity is tacitly applied. See	 also	Gyertyánfy,	 op. cit. (fn. 3), p. 62, footnote 
12.	Furthermore,	with	the	exception	of	multi-territorial	licensing	in	an	online	en-
vironment, the Directive does not affect any type of extended collective licensing 
or similar schemes such as legal presumptions of representation. (See Recital 12 of 
Directive 2014/26/EU.). 
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where it concerns online licensing, it erases the explained mechanisms in rela-
tion to copyright in music (not related rights).6 Types of licences introduced 
by the Directive 2014/26/EU for music copyright do not cover the global re-
pertoire, and therefore the extended-licence schemes or legal presumptions on 
representation are not possible. By applying the new rules for online collective 
management to music copyrights, it turns out that the burden of proof con-
cerning representation is on the CMO. It should be able at any given moment 
to define its repertoire and to prove the chain of title from the original right 
owner to the collective management organisation.7 This refers not only to si-
tuations in which the CMO concludes licensing agreements, but also to situa-
tions in which it enforces the rights in works from its repertoire.8 CMOs lose 
their monopoly position and compete with each other for right owners and for 
users on the whole European market. Therefore it is questionable whether the 
existing tariff-setting procedures regulated in national copyright laws can be 
sustained in relation to collective management music copyright in the online 
environment.	Nevertheless,	 those	new	 rules	do	not,	 at	 least	 for	now,	 affect	
other fields of copyright, nor do they affect related rights.9
3.	 INDIVIDUAL	MANAGEMENT	–	AN	ADVANTAGE	OR	A											
DEFICIENCY?
Individual management of copyright and related rights substantially differs 
from collective management. Here, the right owner himself exercises his rights 
or entitles another person to do so on an individual basis. This other person 
might be an agency, a publisher, a lawyer or some other qualified person. The 
individual right owner is free to negotiate the remuneration for the use of his 
work or other subject matter on an individual basis, for every particular use.
Nevertheless,	there	are	situations	where	the	tariffs	for	particular	types	of	
right owners and for particular types of uses are issued by a guild or a tra-
6 See	also	Porcin,	A.,	The quest for pan-European copyright licensing solutions: A series of 
unfortunate events, Doctrines, Concurrences Journal, no. 4, 2009,  p. 61.
7 Arg. ex	Art.	25	and	26	of	the	Directive	2014/26/EU.
8 See	also	the	observations	of	Gilliéron,	P.,	Collecting Societies and Digital Environment, 
IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 37, 
no.	8,	2006,	pp.	951	–	952.
9 The European Commission advocates the idea that Directive 2014/26/EU is just a 
beginning and that in the future, after analysis of the effects of the Directive, the 
new system based on the principles introduced by the Directive for the online envi-
ronment should be introduced for the non-digital environment as well.
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de	union.	Nevertheless,	those	tariffs	are	not	obligatory,	neither	for	the	right	
owners nor for the users, except for the ones who contractually bind themsel-
ves to apply them.
Even though it might seem that the right owner is in a better position when 
negotiating the remuneration individually, there are examples where whole 
groups of right owners are threatened by this practice, especially in online li-
censing.	For	example,	Directive	2014/26/EU	does	not	affect	the	rights	of	music	
performers	in	online	licensing.	Namely,	the	European	Commission	deems	that	
their rights are indispensably connected with the rights and interests of their 
publishers and phonogram producers due to specific and very intensive con-
tractual relations among them. Therefore, it is assumed that music performers 
should license their rights together with the rights of phonogram producers, 
which	means	individually	and	directly	European-wide.	Nevertheless,	this	so-
lution seems far from being perfect and far from being satisfactory for music 
performers.	We	are	witnessing	 their	 struggle	 to	overcome	 this	 perception.10 
It seems that they are interested in managing their rights through the CMOs 
because they expect more income from this side. In Croatia, for example, the 
national CMO for music performers has issued tariffs for online uses, declaring 
that the online rights of the music performers are not transferred to phono-
gram	producers	but	remain	with	the	music	performers.	Finally,	it	has	brought	
lawsuits against Deezer and Croatian Telecom	claiming	that	performers’	 rights	
are not acquired tacitly in contracts between the performers and phonogram 
producers / publishers and therefore should be administered collectively.11 
4. PROCEDURES FOR TARIFF-SETTING IN COLLECTIVE                
MANAGEMENT
As	shown	supra, in the situation where individual management is not possi-





ciation	of	European	Performers’	Organisations	(AEPO-ARTIS), The International 
Federation	of	Actors	(FIA),	The	International	Federation	of	Musicians	(FIM)	and	
The	 International	Artists	Organisations	 (IAO).	See http://www.fim-musicians.org/
posts/musicians-denounce-industry-practices and http://www.aepo-artis.org/pag-
es/176_1.html (last visited on 10.09.2015).
11 See http://www.huzip.hr/novosti/obavijest-clanovima-huzipa-i-hgua (last visited on 
10.09.2015).
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dual management the right owners and their agents or other representatives 
are free to negotiate remunerations for the use, in collective management the 
rules on imposing remunerations for use, i.e. setting tariffs, are strict and non-
negotiable rules which apply by virtue of the law. Very often official state 
authorities or quasi-official bodies (such as councils, committees or boards of 
experts) are also involved in tariff-setting procedures. 
Here the tariff-setting procedures will be examined. This examination 
includes Central and Eastern Member States of the EU, with a focus on Cro-
atia. Moreover, since its legal system is under strong influence of the German 
and	Austrian	ones,	especially	as	concerns	private	law,	those	systems	will	also	
be	examined.	First	of	all,	the	European	law	shall	be	presented	since	all	of	the	
Member States of the EU are obliged to apply it. 
4.1. European law
The legal regulation of tariff-setting systems in the EU is left to the national 
legislatures, which organise them by taking into consideration the national 
economic environment, the culture of negotiation, the historical background 
and other relevant issues. This question has been touched upon only spora-
dically	 in	 European	 law.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 Satellite	 and	Cable	Directive	
93/83/EEC12 Member States were invited to introduce in their national laws 
mediation mechanisms for the settlement of disputes in which independent 
and impartial mediators should assist the parties in negotiations and propose 
the solution to the dispute, though the parties are not obliged to accept tho-
se proposals.13 This non-binding mediation was introduced to facilitate ne-
gotiations on tariffs and other licensing conditions for cable retransmission 
rights, since the collective management of those rights is obligatory (except for 
broadcasting	organisations),	but	it	was	also	intended	to	serve	as	a	kind	of	“in-
spiration”	for	Member	States	to	introduce	mediation	mechanisms	for	tariffs	
disputes in other fields as well, as shown infra.	Furthermore,	the	InfoSoc	Direc-
tive 2001/29/EC14 in its preamble also adverts to the mediation mechanisms 
12 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJEU L 248 of 6 October 1993 (hereinafter 
Satellite and Cable Directive).
13 See	Recital	30	and	Art.	11	of	the	Satellite	and	Cable	Directive.
14 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, OJEU L 167 of 22 June 2001 (hereinafter InfoSoc Directive). 
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as a tool to help users and right holders to settle disputes, but without giving 
any further instructions.15 The Commission Recommendation of 2005 also en-
courages the Member States to provide for effective dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, in particular in relation to tariffs, licensing conditions, entrustment of 
online rights for management and withdrawal of online rights.16	Nevertheless,	
except for the cable retransmission right, none of the mentioned provisions 
regulates the procedure for tariff-setting. Thus the Member States in Central 
and Eastern Europe developed different solutions. The Directive 2014/26/EU 
is also silent on that issue.
4.2. Hungary
Hungary is an interesting example in which the system for setting the tariff 
is	a	combination	of	private	parties’	negotiations	and	state	intervention.	Accor-
ding	 to	 the	Hungarian	 Copyright	 Act17, there are several state institutions 
involved in tariff-setting whereby the Hungarian Intellectual Property Office 
(HIPO) is competent for the negotiation procedure. Tariffs are set every calen-
dar year but previously published tariffs are to be applied until the procedure 
for new tariffs is finalised, even if the period for which that tariff was in force 
has since expired.18	First,	the	CMO	determines	the	amounts	of	respective	re-
munerations by taking into account all relevant circumstances of the particular 
use and the agreement between the parties reached in the mediation procedure 
before the Mediation Board, if it exists.19 This provision implies that the nego-
tiations between the CMO and users should take place before the tariff-setting 
procedure formally starts and that there is the possibility of prior voluntary, 
non-binding mediation.20	When	the	CMO	submits	the	proposal	of	the	tariff	
15 See Recital 46 of the InfoSoc Directive.






the parties and propose the content of the agreement, which parties may accept 
expressly	or	tacitly	or	simply	refuse.	For	details	see	Arts.	102-105	of	the	Hungarian	
CA.	The	members	of	the	Mediation	Board	are	appointed	from	among	the	members	
of the Council of Copyright Experts, which operates attached to the HIPO giving 
advisory opinions on specific issues arising in copyright-related legal disputes, on 
request of courts and other authorities. The members of the Council of Copyright 
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to HIPO, HIPO is to invite significant users21 and associations of users22 to 
submit	their	observations	on	the	proposed	tariff.	At	the	same	time,	it	invites	the	
Minister of Culture and the Minister of Trade23 to submit their opinion. The 
whole	opinion	procedure	must	be	carried	out	within	60	days.	Finally,	the	tariff	is	
approved in a resolution issued by the Minister of Justice, based on the proposal 
by	the	HIPO,	but	only	if	it	is	in	accordance	with	the	Hungarian	CA.24 More-
over,	if	the	tariff	increases	remunerations	exceeding	the	customers’	price	index	
established by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office for the previous calendar 
year or if it extends the range of users obliged to pay, the Minister of Justice 
approves	the	tariff	only	on	the	basis	of	the	Government’s	decision.25	A	resolu-
tion based on an approval issued by the Minister of Justice is non-appealable26 
and	the	tariff	must	be	published.	Nevertheless,	there	is	a	possibility	for	a	review	
of this resolution with reference to violation of legislation, on the initiative of 
any party which is entitled, in the tariff-setting procedure, to give an opinion, 
as well as the CMO.27 During the review procedure the court may order the 
requesting party to pay a deposit according to the tariff under review or less.28
4.3. Austria
According	to	the	Austrian	Collecting	Societies	Act29, the tariffs and other 
conditions of use of works are set in collective agreements.30 Those agreements 




22 Those whose members pay at least 10% of all remunerations on the basis of the 
respective	tariff.	Art.	92/H	(8)	of	the	Hungarian	CA.	
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are applied as general terms and conditions in individual contracts between 
CMO	and	individual	users	in	the	respective	field.	Where	remuneration	rights	
are prescribed by the law and there is no need to sign individual contracts, 
amounts of remunerations regulated in the collective agreement apply to in-
dividual users even without the signing of individual contracts.31 Collective 
agreements	are	negotiated	between	the	CMO	and	users’	organisations32, for 
an undefined period of time, but each of the parties is entitled to initiate new 
negotiations.33 On the other hand, if there is no collective agreement, the tariff 
is set in a Regulation issued by the Copyright Council34 on request of any inte-
rested party. The Regulation stays in force until it is replaced by the collective 
agreement.35	Nevertheless,	 the	 request	 for	 issuance	 of	 a	Regulation	may	be	
filed only if the prior mediation procedure before the Mediation Committee36 
has failed. The Mediation Committee is supposed to assist the parties to reach 
an agreement and optionally propose the tariff and other licensing conditions 
which should replace the collective agreement. If the parties agree expressly 
or tacitly, this proposal will replace the collective agreement.37 If not, they are 
allowed to approach to the Copyright Council, as previously described. The 
Regulation of the Copyright Council is in fact the final decision on tariffs.
4.4. Germany
In Germany, CMOs are obliged to conclude inclusive agreements with one 
or more associations of users in which appropriate conditions for use of the 
protected subject matters should be regulated. The amounts of remunerations 
31	 According	to	Art.	22	of	the	Austrian	CSA	they	are	applied	as	part	of	every	indi-
vidual	contract	concluded	between	the	CMO	and	the	individual	user.	Where	tariff	




33 If it is initiated earlier than 2 years after entry into force of the existing collective 
agreement, the approval for new negotiations of the Copyright Office is needed.




36 The Mediation or Conciliation Committee consists of three members, two of them 
are elected by each of the parties and these two are entitled to elect an independent 
chairman.	For	details	see	Art.	36	of	the	Austrian	CSA.	
37	 Art.	37	of	the	Austrian	CSA.
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set in those agreements should serve as tariffs.38 If there is no inclusive agree-
ment concluded, each of the parties is entitled to approach the Mediation 
Board. The Board is to assist the parties in negotiations39 and is entitled to 
present a substantiated proposal of the inclusive agreement40, which may be 
accepted tacitly or expressly, or refused.41 During the proceedings before the 
Mediation Board, it is the provisional tariff, which is issued by the Mediation 
Board on request of one of the parties, that applies.42	A	request	regarding	the	
tariff dispute may be presented43 to the court only after the proceedings before 
the Mediation Board are completed. The court then issues a decision which re-
places the inclusive agreement and the tariff. In addition to the described pro-
cedure, in the case of a dispute on tariffs regarding the private copy remune-
ration, the parties may bring the case before the Conciliation Board44, instead 
of the Mediation Board. The conciliator discusses the dispute with the parties 
and mediates in negotiations. He works towards the amicable resolution of the 
dispute. On the basis of the negotiations, he presents to the parties a proposal 
for	dispute	settlement	which	the	parties	may	accept	or	refuse.	Nevertheless,	
each party is entitled at any time to declare that the conciliation has failed and 
turn to the Mediation Board.45 
4.5. Poland
Poland in 2009 introduced a new system46	for	tariff-setting.	As	from	that	
38	 Art.	 12	 and	Art.	 13(1)	 of	 the	Act	 on	Administration	 of	Copyright	 and	Related	
Rights	from	1965,	as	amended;	used	here	is	the	unofficial	consolidated	text	from	
March	2014	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	German	AACRR).
39 The Mediation Board is formed by the Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt and ap-
pointed	by	the	Minister	of	Justice.	For	details	see	Art.14	of	the	German	AACRR.	




43 Request should be presented in the form of a lawsuit. See	Art.	16(1)	of	the	German	
AACRR.
44 The conciliator shall be appointed by the Minister of Justice.
45	 Art.	17a	of	the	German	AACRR.
46 Before 2009 it was optional to approach the Copyright Commission for approval of 
tariffs. See more in Bleszyński, J., Die Rechtsbeziehungen zwischen Verwertungsgesellschaft 
und Nutzer – Das polnische Recht, in: Riesenhuber, K., Wahrnehmungsrecht in Polen, 
Deutschland und Europa, De Gruyter Rechtwissenschaften Verlags-GmbH, Berlin, 
2005,	pp.	120	–	121.	
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time, CMOs are obliged to present the tariffs to the Copyright Commission47 
for approval.48 The approved tariffs apply in contracts to which the respec-
tive	CMO	 is	 a	 party.	Any	 lower	 remunerations	 agreed	 between	 the	 parties	
are deemed invalid and replaced by the remunerations determined by the ta-
riff as approved.49	As	previously	stated,	the	Copyright	Commission	is	entitled	
to approve or refuse the tariff in whole or in part. If it refuses the tariff, it 
must propose reasoned changes of the tariff and present them by a decision.50 
The party dissatisfied by this decision is entitled to approach the court.51 The 
court’s	 decision	 on	 approval	 or	 refusal	 of	 the	 tariff,	 in	 entirety	 or	 in	 part,	
is final and will be enforced. If no party approaches the court, the decision 
of the Copyright Commission containing the changed tariff is final and bin-
ding.52 In addition to the described procedure, disputes regarding the finally 
and bindingly approved tariffs as well as disputes regarding the conclusion of 
the contracts on cable retransmission may be settled by means of mediatory 
proceedings	between	the	parties.	This	mediation	is	voluntary.	A	mediator	is	
selected	from	the	list	of	the	Copyright	Commission’s	arbitrators	by	the	chair-
man of the Commission or by the parties. The mediator proposes a settlement 
which the parties may refuse or accept, tacitly or expressly.53 
4.6. Slovakia
According	 to	 the	 Slovakian	Copyright	 and	Related	 Rights	 Act54, CMOs 
must set tariffs in negotiations with associations of users.55 Collective agree-
47	 The	Copyright	Commission	is	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Culture	and	National	
Heritage	and	consists	of	30	arbitrators.	 It	decides	 in	Adjudicating	Panels,	which	
are groups of 5 members. See	Arts.	1101–11013 of the Polish Copyright and Related 









54	 Act	 of	 4th	 December	 2003	 on	 Copyright	 and	 Rights	 Related	 to	 Copyright,	 as	
amended;	used	here	is	the	unofficial	consolidated	text	from	March	2014	(hereinaf-
ter	Slovak	CRRA).	
55 See	Sec.	49(1)	and	Sec.	81(1)(h)	of	the	Slovak	CRRA.	Here,	 it	 is	noteworthy	to	
mention	that	the	CMOs	may	conclude	collective	agreements;	they	are	not	obliged	
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ments between the CMO and the association of users are binding directly on 
the individual users, members of the respective association of users, as from 
the moment of its accession to the respective agreement.56 If the parties fail to 
agree on an individual license contract or a collective agreement, any of them 
is entitled to approach to the court. The court determines terms of the con-
tract or the agreement and the amount of the remuneration.57	Nevertheless,	
any user who has commenced the use of the work without signing the license 
contract is obliged to submit the action before the court within 30 days from 
the date of the commencement of use and effect payment of the interim re-
muneration through escrow account, notary office or bank guarantee.58  
4.7. Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, when drafting the proposal of a tariff, the CMO 
is obliged to consult relevant associations of users.59 Moreover, the CMO is 
not entitled to raise an enforcement procedure against an individual user if 
this	user	or	the	corresponding	users’	association	enters,	without	undue	delay,	




and users. CMOs may conclude cumulative licensing contracts with individual 
users which regulate their relationships concerning the extended collective li-
cence. On the other hand, they are entitled to enter into collective agreements 
with associations of users where the tariffs are set.61 In both of those cases, 
any of the parties, where there is a dispute, may call upon the mediation of 
one or more mediators who are appointed by the Minister of Culture. The 
mediator(s) assist the parties in negotiations and, if necessary, submit to them 
proposals for settlement of their dispute. The proposal may be accepted expre-
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ssly or tacitly, or refused.62 It is not regulated whether the parties are allowed 
to approach to the court if mediation fails.
4.8. Romania
Besides Hungary, Romania is another example of a country whose tariff-
setting	procedure	looks	like	very	complicated.	According	to	the	Romanian	Co-
pyright	and	Related	Rights	Act63, the CMO initiates the negotiation procedure 
for tariff-setting by filing an application with the Romanian Copyright Office, 
accompanied by the methodology proposed for negotiations and the list of 
associations of users. The Copyright Office establishes the negotiation com-
mission, made up of representatives of the CMO(s) and the association(s) of 
users.64	The	parties’	agreement	is	registered	in	a	protocol,	filed	with	the	Co-
pyright Office and officially published. If so published, it represents the tariff 
and is applicable to all of the users in the respective field.65 If such an agree-
ment is not reached within 45 days, the Copyright Office initiates arbitration 
proceedings.66	The	Arbitration	Panel	issues	the	final	decision	on	the	tariff	and	
the methodology within 30 (possibly 45) days, submits it to the Copyright 
Office	and	publishes	 it	officially.	After	being	published,	 the	decision	of	 the	
Arbitration	Panel	is	applicable	to	all	users	in	the	respective	field.	Nevertheless,	
this decision is contestable before the court.67	After	the	described	procedure	
is completed, each of the parties is allowed to initiate a new negotiating pro-
cedure for methodology and tariffs, though not before the expiry of a period 
of three years (for private copying 2 years). The former methodology and the 
tariff remain in force until the publication of the new ones.68	Nevertheless,	
the remunerations established as a lump sum are to be annually modified by 
the CMO on the basis of the inflation index established by the competent 
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are entitled to agree to mediation, should they fail to establish the metho-
dologies and the tariff by negotiations, but before the initiation of the arbi-
tration proceedings. Mediation is optional and represents an additional step, 
in comparison to the tariff-setting procedure for other types of exploitation. 
The mediators assist the parties in negotiations and propose solutions, which 
might be accepted tacitly or expressly, or refused. If the proposal of the soluti-
on is refused by the parties, the arbitration proceedings should be instituted, 
as described above.70
4.9. Bulgaria
According	to	the	Bulgarian	Copyright	and	Related	Rights	Act71, the tariffs 
are to be proposed by the CMO and approved by the Minister of Culture.72 
Nevertheless,	the	proposal	may	be	submitted	to	the	Minister	of	Culture	only	
after	a	preliminary	discussion	with	the	respective	users’	organisations,	where	
possible.73 If a preliminary discussion results in an agreement on tariff, the 
Minister approves it. If not, the Minister appoints an expert commission for 
each particular case which is entitled to decide on the proposal of the tariff 
filed by the CMO. The expert commission submits its written report, wherein 
the amounts of remunerations are proposed to the Minister. He then approves 
or refuses the report.74 Until the new tariff is set, the existing one applies, but 
where no such tariff is available, the remunerations are paid according to the 
agreement between the parties and deposited in an escrow account.75 In any 
case, in every tariff dispute, apart from the described procedure, each party is 
entitled to call upon mediation.76 The mediator may submit written proposals 
to the parties. The parties may accept those proposals expressly or tacitly, or 






impossible, the Minister of Culture carries out the public consultation by publish-
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4.10. Estonia
In Estonia, CMOs are entitled to determine tariffs by way of negotiations 
with the association of users.78 Tariff disputes may submitted to the Copyright 
Committee appointed by the government. The Copyright Committee is an 
expert	mediation	body	within	the	meaning	of	the	Mediation	Act.79 This im-
plies that there are no binding effects of the proposals or decisions of the Co-
pyright Committee if the parties do not accept them.
4.11. Lithuania
In Lithuania, the tariffs are set by a collective agreement between the CMO 
and the association(s) of users. If there is no agreement, each of the parties 
may call for mediation80 before the Copyright Council or other mediator. The 
Council proposes the tariff. 81 If the parties do not accept this proposal, each of 
them is entitled to approach the court for setting the tariff. 
4.12. Latvia
In Latvia, the tariffs are negotiated between the CMO and association(s) of 
users.82	According	to	the	Latvian	Copyright	Act	mediation	is	available	only	in	
tariff disputes related to cable retransmission.83 If the parties cannot agree on 
the election of the mediator, the mediator is to be appointed by the Minister 
of Culture. The mediator is entitled to propose a solution, which the parties 
may accept, tacitly or expressly, or refuse. The mediation procedure does not 





here is the unofficial consolidated text from March 2014 (hereinafter Lithuanian 
CRRA).




83 It is also regulated that the mediation is available also for disputes concerning free 
use vs. technological protection measures.
84 See Secs. 671-673	of	the	Latvian	CRRA.	There	are	no	details	on	the	court	procedure,	
so the general rules should apply.
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4.13. Slovenia
In	 Slovenia,	 the	 tariffs	 are	 negotiated	 between	 the	 CMO	 and	 users’	
association(s) in an inclusive agreement.85 If there is no association of users due 
to the nature of the respective field, an inclusive agreement may be concluded 
with the individual user.86 During the negotiations, the existing tariff applies, 
and if there is no tariff, the CMO may itself fix a provisional tariff.87 If the ne-
gotiations on the tariff fail88, the tariff must be set by the Copyright Board89, 
which is appointed by the Minister of Economy.90	Also,	anyone	who	demon-
strates legal interest is entitled to submit to the Copyright Board a request to 
examine whether the existing tariff is appropriate, unless the Board has already 
decided on this issue.91 In this case, the Board may approve, amend or annul 
the contested tariff in whole or in part.92 During the proceedings, when nece-
ssary, the Copyright Board may fix the provisional tariff, which will apply until 
the final decision is issued.93 The final decision of the Board may substitute 
for an inclusive agreement or constitute a part of it.94 The decision of the Co-
pyright Board may be contested before the Supreme Court, which must exami-
ne it within the bounds of the lawsuit submitted by the dissatisfied party.95 In 
addition to the described tariff-setting proceedings, there is also a possibility 
of mediation, regarding the dispute on tariffs related to cable retransmission. 
The mediator shall in those cases be appointed by the parties from the list of 
mediators published by the government on the proposal of the Minister of 
Economy. The mediator must ensure that the parties conduct negotiations in 
85	 Art.	156(2)	of	the	Copyright	and	Related	Rights	Act	from	1995,	as	amended;	used	




88	 The	negotiations	 should	be	concluded	within	 four	months.	Art.	157a	 (1)	of	 the	
Slovenian	CRRA.
89	 Arts.	156(2)	and	157a	(1)	of	the	Slovenian	CRRA.
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good faith and is entitled to submit a proposal to solve the dispute which may 
be refused or accepted, expressly or tacitly.96
4.14. Croatia
In Croatia, the tariffs are set by the CMO. The CMO is obliged to submit the 
proposal of the tariff for observations to the Croatian Chamber of Economy, 
Croatian	Chamber	of	Trades	and	Crafts	and	the	Association	of	Broadcasting	
Organisations. If the CMO does not accept their observations, it is obliged to 
approach to the Council of Experts (an independent expert body, appointed 
by the Minister of Science, Education and Sports)97 for a non-binding opinion. 
This opinion must contain the evaluation of whether the remunerations con-
form	to	the	tariff-setting	principles	provided	for	in	the	Croatian	CRRA.	After	
this procedure is accomplished, the tariff is officially published. During the 
procedure, the due remuneration must be paid in accordance with the existing 
tariff or, if there is no existing tariff, as an advance in accordance with the pro-
posed tariff.98	In	addition	to	the	described	procedure	Croatian	CRRA	provides	
for mediation for cable retransmission agreements. If the negotiations on the 
agreement for cable retransmission fail, each of the parties is entitled to call 
upon the mediation of the Council of Experts. In this case, the Council assists 
the parties to achieve the agreement and may submit proposals for solutions, 
which the parties may refuse or accept, expressly or tacitly.99  
4.15. Results of the comparison of national copyright laws
Analysis	of	the	data	laid	out	above	shows	that	the	first	and	most	welcomed	
way of setting the tariff is by negotiation between CMO and association(s) of 
users. Two of the analysed countries (Hungary and Romania) provide for the 
negotiations on tariffs to be conducted through state executive bodies, such as 
the intellectual property office or copyright office. Here, the involvement of 
96 See	Art.163	of	the	Slovenian	CRRA.	The	Government	shall	define	by	a	decree	the	
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the state authorities is the most intensive and direct. They serve as a kind of 
surety that the negotiations will be conducted in the right direction.100
Further,	in	three	of	the	analysed	countries	(Hungary,	Poland	and	Bulgaria)	
the tariffs are proposed by the CMO but already previously negotiated with 
the relevant organization(s) of users. The negotiated tariffs are analysed by the 
expert authorities (minister or commission appointed by the minister) which 
approves or refuses the tariff. In those cases the involvement of the state is also 
very intensive and direct since the approval comes from the executive state 
authority or the commission appointed by the executive state authority and 
without the approval there is no tariff.
All	of	the	analysed	countries,	except	Slovakia,	have	some	kind	of	mediati-
on, at least for cable retransmission rights (Poland, Romania, Latvia, Slovenia 
and	Croatia).	Other	countries	(Hungary,	Austria,	Germany,	Czech	Republic,	
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania) have optional mediation for all types of dis-
putes related to tariffs. The mediators are in most cases appointed by the 
competent minister, as a board or committee or simply as an independent 
mediator. The mediator assists the parties to reach an amicable settlement 
for their dispute and is also entitled to give his own proposals for solving the 
respective	problem.	Nevertheless,	the	mediation	is	in	most	cases	optional	and	
in all cases the proposals of the mediator are non-binding for the parties in a 
tariff	dispute.	Nevertheless,	if	the	parties	accept	the	proposal	of	the	mediator,	
it becomes binding and enforceable.101 In Croatia, instead of pursuing media-
tion, in every tariff-setting proceeding, the CMO is to approach the Council of 
Experts for a non-binding opinion. So, it might be concluded that almost all of 
the analysed countries do have some kind of mediation whereby the mediation 
100 State intervention in setting the tariffs is a kind of restriction of the rights of the 
right owners. See	Gyertyánfy,	op. cit. (fn. 3), p. 63.
101	 On	the	contrary,	the	European	Commission	in	its	Staff	Working	Document,	Im-
pact	Assessment	accompanying	the	document	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online 
uses	in	the	internal	market	of	11	July	2012,	COM(2012)	372	final,	SWD(2012)	
205	final,	Brussels	(hereinafter	Impact	Assessment)	described	the	German	system	
as a combination of arbitration and litigation since the proposal accepted by the 
parties in the mediation procedure becomes enforceable. It also concludes that in 
Hungary there is no specific alternative resolution mechanism and that in most of 
the European Member States there are no mediation systems covering all kind of 
disputes;	see p. 119 and footnotes 258 and 259. The analysis here shows different 
results.
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body is appointed by the state authority. In those cases the involvement of the 
state in the tariff-setting proceedings is very low and indirect since the propo-
sals	of	the	mediators	are	non-binding.	Nonetheless,	once	the	parties	accept	the	
proposal of the mediator(s) expressly or tacitly, this tariff becomes binding and 
enforceable. 
In	four	of	the	analysed	countries	(Austria,	Romania,	Bulgaria	and	Slovenia)	
there are arbitration bodies, such as a copyright committee, arbitration panel, 
expert commission or copyright board. Those arbitration bodies are appointed 
by the competent state executive authority but have the status of independent 
expert bodies. Their task is to impose the tariff if previous negotiations or 
mediations have failed and the tariff was not established within a certain pe-
riod of time. This means that the involvement of the state in the tariff-setting 
procedure is indirect but intensive. It is qualified as indirect because the ar-
bitration bodies do have the status of independent experts although they are 
appointed by the state authority. It is qualified as intensive because the deci-
sions of the arbitration bodies are binding or final, although in some countries 
contestable before the competent court. 
And	finally,	eight	of	the	analysed	countries	(Hungary,	Germany,	Poland,	
Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia) provide in their copyright 
acts for court proceedings, either civil or administrative, as the final step in the 
tariff-setting procedure. In all of those countries, on request of a non-satisfied 
party, the competent court issues a final and non-contestable decision on the 
tariff. In fact, the court sets the tariff. In the five remaining countries, which 
do not provide for court intervention in the tariff-setting procedure in their 
copyright acts, it might be assumed that the court proceedings could be possi-
ble according to the general rules regulating civil procedure. Since the judicial 
authorities should be strictly separated from the executive state authorities, 
here the influence of the state is circumvented.
It should also be concluded that all of the national rules regarding tariff-
setting procedures are non-negotiable strict rules which apply by virtue of the 
law. The parties are not entitled to change or circumvent them. So far, they 
have been an expression of the territorial nature of collective management of 
copyright and related rights and therefore they applied to all tariffs of national 
CMOs and disputes related to those tariffs.102
102 The results of this research were also used in the text Matanovac Vuckovic, R., 
Implementation of Directive 2014/26/EU on Collective Management and Multi Territorial 
Licensing of Musical Rights in Regulating the Tariff-Setting Systems in Central and Eastern 
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5. CRITERIA FOR SETTING TARIFFS
5.1. European law 
In EU law there is no systematic approach to the criteria for setting ta-
riffs.	This	 issue	 is	 regulated	only	 sporadically	 in	 some	of	 the	directives.	An	
example is the Satellite and Cable Directive, where some criteria for tariffs for 
broadcasting are given: all aspects of broadcast, such as the actual audience, 
the potential audience and the language version.103 In the Rental and Lending 
Directive104 there are also some directions for establishing criteria for setting 
the amount of remuneration.105 In the preamble of the InfoSoc Directive the-
re are provisions which regulate the criteria for setting fair compensation for 
private copying.106 
The CJEU has also taken standpoints on criteria for setting tariffs in several 
judgements.	Although	those	judgements	are	relevant	for	particular	situations	
and	problems	(such	as	the	problem	of	CMOs’	territorial	monopoly),	some	ge-
neral	principles	might	also	be	derived.	For	instance,	in	the	Lagardre case107 it 
is pointed out that each of the Member States of the EU is free to determine 
the criteria for tariff-setting as well as to decide on the methodology by which 
the amounts of the remunerations are to be calculated. In SENA108 the CJEU 
concluded that the concept of equitable remuneration appearing in the Rental 
and Lending Directive must be regarded as an autonomous provision of EU 
law and must be interpreted uniformly throughout the EU.109 The CJEU stated 
that in defining the criteria for determining equitable remuneration, in parti-
cular the value of the use in trade should be taken into account.110 The value of 
Europe, IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
vol.	47,	no.	1,	2016,	pp.	28	–	59.
103 See Recital 17 of the Satellite and Cable Directive.
104 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 De-
cember 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJEU L 376 of 27 December 2006 
(codified version) (hereinafter Rental and Lending Directive).
105 See Recital	13	and	Art.	6(1)	of	the	Rental	and	Lending	Directive.	
106 See Recitals 35, 36, 38, and 39 of the InfoSoc Directive.
107 CJEU case C-192/04 (Lagardre), [2005] ECR I-07199.    
108 CJEU case C-245/00 (SENA), [2003] ECR I-01251.    
109 See SENA, at 22 and 24. 
110 See SENA, at 37.
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the use in trade was also highlighted in Kanal 5 Ltd111, where the CJEU found 
that the abuse of a monopoly position may lie in the imposition of a price 
which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided.112 
This was repeated in the OSA case113, confirming the position the Court had 
taken even before, in the landmark cases Tournier114 and Lucazeau.115, 116
While	Directive	2014/26/EU	is	silent	on	tariff-setting	procedures,	it	regu-
lates	 the	criteria	 for	setting	the	tariffs.	According	to	this	Directive	 licensing	
terms must be based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria117 and tariffs 
must be reasonable in relation to, inter alia, the economic value of the use of 
the rights in trade, taking into account the nature and scope of the use, as well 
as in relation to the economic value of the service provided by the CMO.118 
Those criteria were already instituted by the CJEU, as explained supra.	Accor-
ding to Directive 2014/26/EU, there are no differences in criteria for setting 
the tariffs for online and offline uses.119
5.2. National laws
In	most	of	the	analysed	countries,	with	the	exception	of	Austria,	Estonia	
and Lithuania, criteria for setting tariffs are provided for in the relevant co-
pyright acts. They are regulated generally, for all types of usage, on the prin-
ciple of non-exhaustive lists of elements which should be taken into account 
111 CJEU case C-52/07 (Kanal 5 Ltd), [2008] ECR I-09275. This case is also the refer-
ral case for the Commission, see	Impact	Assessment,	p.	66.
112 See Kanal 5 Ltd, at 28 and 37. 
113 See OSA, at 85, 87, 88, 92 and 93. 
114 CJEU case C-395/87 (Tournier), [1989] ECR 02521.     
115 CJEU case C-110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 (Lucazeau), [1989] ECR 02811).
116 See Tournier,	at	38,	43,	46;	Lucazeau, at 33. See	also:	Frabboni,	M.	M.,	Collective man-
agement of copyright and related rights: achievements and problems of institutional efforts 
towards harmonisation, in: Derclaye, E. (ed.), Research handbook on the future of EU 
copyright,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	Cheltenham,	2009,	p.	380;	Guibault,	L.,	van	
Gompel, S., Collective Management in the European Union, in: Gervais, D. (ed.), Col-




119 Except for online services, it is specially regulated that the licensing terms already 
agreed upon for a new type of online service that has been available to the public in 
the EU for less than three years may not be used as a precedent for the creation of 
other tariffs. See	Art.	16(2)(1)	and	Recital	32	of	Directive	2014/26/EU.
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while setting the tariffs. In Hungary, for example, it is regulated that all re-
levant circumstances of the use concerned shall be taken into account.120	As	
relevant criteria most of the countries mention economic income from the use 
(Germany121, Poland122, Czech Republic123, Romania124, Bulgaria125, Latvia126, 




many129, Poland130, Slovakia131, Czech Republic132, Latvia133, Croatia134). Par-
ticular complexity of collective management due to certain types of use is also 
taken into consideration while setting the tariffs (Slovenia135), and sometimes 
also indirect economic benefit of the use (Czech Republic136, Latvia137). In ca-
ses where the use does not provide income, the criteria mentioned are non-eco-
nomic benefit or even costs of the use (Latvia138, Slovenia139, and Croatia140). 
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vant criteria. In some of the countries, the tariffs should be proportionate to 
the use of the protected subject matters as a whole (Germany144, Slovenia145), 
to the repertoire (Romania146), to the total amount paid by users to all CMOs 
in the respective field (Poland147) or to individual right owners (Romania148, 
Slovenia149).	The	Polish	CRRA150 also mentions justified public interest as a 
criterion for setting the tariffs. In Germany it is regulated that due care should 
be given to the religious, cultural and social significance of the use as well as 
youth welfare.151	And	finally,	the	Polish	CRRA152 furthermore regulates yearly 
valorisation of the tariffs expressed in a lump sum. 
5.3. Results of the comparison
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that the criteria 
for setting tariffs are consistent throughout the analysed countries. Generally 
speaking, there are no significant or conceptual deviations among them.153 
Moreover, so far, the described criteria are in line with the criteria provided for 
by EU law, especially by the jurisprudence of the CJEU. It was undoubtedly 
concluded, both by the national legislatures and by the CJEU, that the princi-
ple of territoriality applies and that each of the Member States is free to deter-
mine the criteria for setting tariffs as well as to decide on the methodology by 










153	 In	this	context	 it	 is	worthwhile	 to	mention	a	curiosity	 from	Art.	23	of	 the	Czech	
CRRA,	which	regulates	maximum	remuneration	for	all	right	holders,	for	communica-
tion to the public in hotel rooms and similar accommodation premises. This type of 
provision	is	unusual	and	was	very	much	disputed.	Namely,	the	total	remuneration	
for all right holders in this case may not exceed 50% of the fee due for every device 
in	hotel	rooms	or	other	accommodation	premises.	Another	curiosity	in	this	context	is	
the	provision	of	the	Romanian	CRRA	which	regulates	that	the	maximum	amount	for	
neighbouring rights may not exceed 1/3 of the negotiated remuneration for copyright 
for the same category of users. See	Art.134	(2)(g)	of	the	Romanian	CRRA.	
154 See Matanovac Vuckovic, R., op. cit. (fn. 102).
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6. CONCLUSION
The systems for setting the remunerations in individual and collective 
management differ significantly. Since in individual management the right 
owners, their agents or other representatives are completely free to negotiate 
the amounts of remuneration for the exploitation of their creations, in collec-
tive management the national copyright laws provide for strict procedures for 
setting the tariffs. Those procedures apply by virtue of law and the parties are 
not entitled to negotiate, change or circumvent them. Those national rules for 
tariff-setting are regulated in order to secure legal certainty and control over 
the national CMOs as monopolists in the collective management of rights. 
Since the creators and their CMOs are not free in setting the tariffs in collec-
tive management, their position in this respect can be qualified as a kind of 
limitation	in	exercising	the	rights	of	creators.	Nevertheless,	the	intervention	
of the state or quasi-state authorities in tariff-setting procedures in collective 
management does not change the nature of copyright and related rights, which 
remain private rights.
It seems that Directive 2014/26/EU does not affect the existing tariff-
setting systems for traditional means of exploitation of copyrighted works and 
subject matters protected by related rights, since it is neutral with regard to the 
monopolistic position of national CMOs and the representation of the global 
repertoire in the offline environment. This means that there are no obstacles 
for national legislatures to keep in force the existing rules with regard to tra-
ditional uses. 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether those rules can be applied to 
online licensing for music copyright, since the provisions of Directive 2014/26/
EU give up the paradigm of monopolistic CMOs and territoriality of collective 
management. Therefore, it seems that there is no need for state intervention 
in tariff-setting procedures and that CMOs which compete with each other 
for users and right owners are also entitled to compete on tariffs. In those 
circumstances, in order to encourage competition, it seems that CMOs should 
be	completely	free	in	determining	the	remuneration	for	authors.	Nevertheless,	
this system where there is competition on tariffs could lead to the race-to-the-
bottom and result in pure remunerations for creators.
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Sažetak
Romana Matanovac Vučković *
NAKNADE ZA AUTORE I DRUGE STVARATELJE U 
KOLEKTIVNOM OSTVARIVANJU AUTORSKOG I 
SRODNIH PRAVA
Kreativne industrije danas su vrlo važan dio kompleksnog mehanizma poticaja 
gospodarskog rasta i razvoja kako u Europskoj uniji tako i drugdje u razvijenom svijetu. 
Stvaratelji autorskih djela i drugih intelektualnih tvorevina zato svakako zaslužuju 
naknadu za svoj autorski i drugi stvaralački rad. Ta se naknada može realizirati u 
individualnom ili u kolektivnom sustavu ostvarivanja autorskog i srodnih prava. 
Individualno ostvarivanje karakterizira neposredno pregovaranje između autora 
ili drugog nositelja prava, s jedne strane, i korisnika, s druge strane. Pregovara se o 
svakom pojedinačnom korištenju autorskog djela ili predmeta srodnog prava. Također, 
u slučaju individualnog ostvarivanja, nositelji prava mogu ovlastiti agenta, odvjetnika 
ili publishera da u njihovo ime i za njihov račun vodi pregovore i individualno ostvaruje 
njihova prava. Ako pregovori u pogledu individualnog iskorištavanja uspiju, sklapa se 
ugovor u kojem se određuje autorska naknada odnosno naknada nositeljima srodnih 
prava, u pravilu kao paušalan iznos koji dospijeva odmah ili u anuitetima ili kao postotak 
od prihoda od iskorištavanja. U svakome slučaju, nositelj prava potpuno je slobodan u 
određivanju iznosa naknade za korištenje svojeg autorskog djela ili predmeta srodnog 
prava. Za razliku od takve situacije, vrlo se često autorsko i srodna prava ostvaruju 
u kolektivnom sustavu gdje organizacija za kolektivno ostvarivanje ostvaruje prava za 
račun većeg broja nositelja prava. U tome slučaju naknada se utvrđuje kolektivnim 
pregovaranjem između organizacije za kolektivno ostvarivanje prava i nekog kolektivnog 
tijela koje predstavlja korisnike. Budući da su organizacije za kolektivno ostvarivanje 
prava do sada bile ustrojene na načelu teritorijalnih monopola i zastupale su na teritoriju 
na kojem su osnovane cijeli svjetski repertoar, uglavnom se u nacionalnim propisima 
uređivala procedura donošenja cjenika za korištenje autorskih djela, kao i kriteriji za 
određivanje predmetnih naknada. Ta procedura trebala bi biti jamstvo da će naknada 
koja se odredi biti primjerena i pravična kako s motrišta nositelja prava tako i s motrišta 
korisnika. Također, ona je do sada služila za kontrolu teritorijalnih monopola koje su 
uživale organizacije za kolektivno ostvarivanje prava. Budući da propisana procedura 
ograničava nositelje prava u pogledu kriterija i procedure određivanja naknade i budući 
da u kolektivnom pregovaranju pojedini autor odnosno drugi nositelj prava ne može 
*		 Dr.	 sc.	Romana	Matanovac	Vučković,	 docentica	Pravnog	 fakulteta	Sveučilišta	 u	
Zagrebu,	Trg	maršala	Tita	14,	Zagreb;	romana.matanovac.vuckovic@pravo.hr
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ostvariti svoje partikularne interese i ciljeve, već mora djelovati zajedno sa svim drugim 
autorima i nositeljima prava, postupak određivanja naknade u kolektivnom ostvarivanju 
prava zapravo se može okarakterizirati kao svojevrsno ograničenje u izvršavanju odnosno 
ostvarivanju prava. 
Ključne riječi: autorsko pravo, autorskom srodna prava, naknada za autore i nositelje 
srodnih prava, individualno ostvarivanje autorskog prava, kolektivno ostvarivanje 
autorskog prava
